Travel Low Moor, Bradford Map

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Low Moor, Bradford history

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Before 1790 Low Moor was nothing but a hamlet where a small number of cottages housed a few handloom weavers. The village changed beyond all recognition around 1790 due to the establishment of the Low Moor Ironworks. The rapid rise in the number of employees caused a great increase in the local population.

1916 Low Moor Explosion

Low Moor Munitions Company, formerly the Low Moor Chemical Company, was destroyed in August 1916. The explosion took place at the premises where picric acid, used in the making of high explosives, was being manufactured in large quantities. Damage to surrounding areas was extensive with broken windows in all houses and shops for 2 miles (3.2 km) around.

Fire of 1992

On Tuesday 21 July 1992 a series of explosions leading to an intense fire broke out in a storeroom in a raw materials warehouse at Allied Colloids site in Low Moor, Bradford. The fire spread rapidly to the remainder of the warehouse and external chemical drum storage. Although none of the company employees were injured, 33 people, including three residents and 30 fire and/or police officers were taken to hospital where they were treated for smoke inhalation. Approximately 2000 local residents were confined to their houses and residents in eight properties immediately adjacent to the raw materials warehouse were evacuated. The incident was first noted by a fork lift truck driver at 13:30 hours who saw a fume coming from a vent in what was termed an ‘oxystore’. He set off the fire alarm which alerted the works fire brigade. They, along with five senior managers and the safety manager, investigated and found that a number of kegs of azodiisobutyronitrile (AZDN), which is a reducing agent and which had been stored on an upper shelf, had ruptured and spilled their contents on the floor and had created a dust cloud. There was also a portion of a ceiling insulation tile on the ground. Part of it, which remained in situ, bore the marks of impact from a keg lid. In the immediate vicinity of the spilled AZDN there were bags of sodium persulphate (SPS), an oxidising agent. The internal fire crew brought up an appliance and laid out their hoses, but it was decided to clear up the spillage by means of a vacuum cleaner. At 14:15 hours the shift chemist could see that a reaction was taking place in or near a bag of SPS. A flame developed, followed by a flash and he was forced to retreat. There was a further explosion (probably a dust explosion) which blew him over. By this time people were running away from the scene. The public fire brigade were called at 14:22 hours and began arriving at 14:28 hours. There was thus a lapse of time of some 52 minutes between the first discovery, which resulted in the internal fire alarm being sounded, and the public fire brigade being summoned. The brigade found that it was facing an intense fire. At its peak it required 36 appliances and 173 fire-fighters to combat it. The mains water supply proved inadequate and water had to be pumped from adjacent dams. The fire spread throughout the warehouse and smoke was blown towards nearby motorways. The fire was contained that day and the fire brigade was not stood down until 18 days later due to risk of re-ignition during clean up. Considerable environmental damage to the Aire and Calder rivers resulted from the firewater run off. Allied Colloids were convicted under the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974, Section 2 (two counts) and Section 3. The fire caused considerable local anxiety. In view of this the Health and Safety Executive published its investigation report. The investigation established that the fire had been initiated by the thermal decomposition of kegs of the thermally unstable reducing agent, AZDN in oxystore 2. This had arisen because of the proximity of the kegs to a hot steam condensate return line. There was a total of 1.9 tonnes of AZDN in oxystore 2. The powder released reacted with sodium persulphate, an oxidising agent, which was stored adjacent to it. It was also capable of burning in air. An immediate underlying cause was that AZDN, a reducing agent, which was a chemical in regular use by AC had, for store-keeping purposes, been wrongly classified, in 1989, as an oxidising agent. This was why it was stored in an ‘oxystore’. Management of warehousing was another factor. Originally each production department had its own warehousing arrangements but this seems to have led to difficulties. To overcome these difficulties the Company had set up a ‘Logistics’ department in 1990. Though its area of responsibilities is not made clear in the HSE Report, it seems reasonable to assume that the chief responsibilities of the department were (1) receiving and storing raw materials, (2) storing, packaging and dispatching finished materials, (3) transporting raw materials from store to the point of production and (4) for taking finished chemicals from the point of production into store. It seems also to have had the responsibility for transporting and storing some intermediate products. The magnitude of these operations was disclosed by the 125 people employed in the department. However none of those employed in the Logistics department was qualified in chemistry. This was no doubt the reason why the errors in the classification of AZDN was not noticed. Nor was anyone in the Logistics department qualified in safety. AZDN kegs were stored in the same section of the warehouse as SPS and other oxidising substances, after being wrongly classified in the documentation. Segregation of Hazardous Materials[1]: Warehouse storage, Incompatible substances Raw Materials Control / Sampling[2]: Safety management systems Failure of the steam heating system or operator error meant that heating was applied in No. 2 oxystore as well as in the main warehouse. Plant Modification / Change Procedures[3]: Decommissioning procedures The oxystores and warehouse were not fitted with adequate smoke detection and fire fighting facilities. Active / Passive Fire Protection[4] The fire brigade and police should have been informed immediately the first incident had been discovered. As it was there was a 50-minute delay before the fire occurred and the emergency services informed. Emergency Response / Spill control[5]: Site emergency plan, Stabilising to safe condition, fire fighting Significant environmental damage was caused to the Aire and Calder rivers by the fire-water run-off. Emergency Response / Spill Control[6]: Fire fighting Secondary Containment[7]: bunds, catchpots, barriers.

  

Low Moor, Bradford map & travel guide with history & landmarks to explore

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Tourist Guide to Low Moor, Bradford Map

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